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Abstract Contrary to what common sense makes us
believe, deliberation without attention has recently been
suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations
than deliberation with attention. Based on differences
between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we
hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions
after consciously thinking about complex problems
whereas novices may beneﬁt from deliberation-without-
attention. These hypotheses were conﬁrmed in a study
among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed
complex and routine problems under three conditions, an
immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions:
conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention.
Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when
problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not
matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-with-
out-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in
simple problems. Experts beneﬁt from consciously think-
ing about complex problems; for novices thinking does not
help in those cases.
Introduction
Imagine that you are a physician and that you are presented
with a complex case. The most obvious thing to do would
be to think for a while about the case, consider alternative
diagnoses, and weigh the evidence in the light of these
diagnoses before taking a decision. In this way you would
ensure that your decision is the best you can make. Or
would it? Not if you accept the ﬁndings reported in several
studies by Dijksterhuis (2004) and Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Nordgren and van Baaren (2006).
Dijksterhuis and colleagues have conducted a series of
experiments demonstrating a peculiar phenomenon, the
‘‘deliberation-without-attention’’ effect. When participants
in these experiments had to pick the best product out of a
collection of products, e.g., the best car among a number of
cars presented to them, they were more likely to pick the
best one if the investigators prevented them from thinking
about their decision by giving them a distraction task.
Being allowed to think about their choice, performance was
poorer. This only occurred if the choice was sufﬁciently
complex. In simple cases, conscious deliberation helped
more than deliberation-without-attention. The investiga-
tors’ advice to the readers was therefore to think con-
sciously about simple matters but to delegate thinking
about more complex matters to the unconscious.
These ﬁndings go against folk wisdom advising us ‘‘to
think before you act.’’ They are also surprising because
they seem to contradict a long tradition of research show-
ing that being encouraged to think about the solution of a
problem usually helps in solving that problem, in particular
when the problem is complex (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer,
Epley & Eyre, 2007; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003).
Why would unconscious thinking be superior to more
analytic forms of thinking if complex decisions have to be
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DOI 10.1007/s00426-010-0281-8made? Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) mention two
reasons. The ﬁrst is that consciousness (here equalized to
working memory) has only limited capacity. If the amount
of information to be integrated into a decision becomes too
large, we would tend to use only a subset of that infor-
mation, producing suboptimal decisions. The second is that
conscious thought can lead to suboptimal weighting of the
importance of the various information elements. When
objects to be chosen have many attributes, conscious
thought would lead to overweight some features in detri-
ment of others, resulting in poorer choices.
We argue here that there may be alternative explana-
tions for Dijksterhuis et al.’s ﬁndings. First, methodologi-
cal shortcomings may be involved. In typical studies (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) participants had to choose one
from several objects (the best car among different makes of
cars) whose attributes were presented in a scrambled
fashion. This is hardly how problems present themselves in
everyday life and may have added considerably to memory
load, possibly favoring pure associative processes. In
addition, the attributes were assumed to have similar
weight, which is an assumption rarely met in real life. For a
family man who travels with several kids, a car with a large
trunk may be more important than it is for a man who is not
married. Furthermore, an immediate-decision condition
was lacking in some studies (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).
Asking participants to decide immediately after presenta-
tion of the material would have enabled them to check
whether delayed deliberation without attention actually
improves decision-making. These particular experiments,
therefore, allowed only for the conclusion that deliberation
with attention leads to poorer decision-making. Finally,
there was no attempt to control whether the participants
were in fact thinking about the problems in the delibera-
tion-with-attention condition. Participants were just asked
to think about their choices without any check that they
were really doing so.
In addition to these methodological shortcomings, it
may be argued that experience with the problem-to-be-
solved, a factor not taken into consideration by Dijksterhuis
(2004) and Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), crucially inﬂuences
the quality of deliberation. Participants in their studies
were usually novices (e.g., students who had probably
never bought a car) without extended knowledge of the
domain in which they had to deliberate. A recent study on
sports predictions intended to investigate the inﬂuence of
expertise (Dijksterhuis, Bos, van der Leij & van Baaren,
2009). Participants were again, however, solely students.
Furthermore, the way in which expertise was operational-
ized in this study—as knowledge of a single fact in the
domain—hardly represents the expertise of professionals
with an extensive knowledge base and experience in
solving problems in complex domains.
Second, when the expertise factor is brought into the
equation, arguments based on the limited capacity of
consciousness seem to lose some of their appeal. This is
so because the cognitive structures and processes that
experts and novices bring to the task of solving a problem
differ. Experts have more relevant knowledge available
than students, and this knowledge is better organized and
tuned to the task-at-hand. Knowledge in long-term
memory provides, once activated, scaffolding for incom-
ing information, thereby evading the working-memory
limitations that plague novices (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser,
1981; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). If the deliberation-
without-attention effect derives from the limitations of
consciousness, as Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006)
suggest, it would therefore not necessarily occur in
experts’ decision-making. It is known that experienced
professionals tend to make choices, usually appropriately,
without engaging in conscious analysis of the problem
(Norman, 2005; Osman, 2004). What most frequently
happens is that an expert recognizes a problem-at-hand as
similar to one previously encountered—a process that has
been termed ‘‘pattern-recognition’’—and rapidly retrieves
from memory a representation that leads to an appropriate
solution (Evans, 2008; Norman & Brooks, 1997; Schmidt,
Norman & Boshuizen, 1990). Nevertheless, one may
reasonably assume that, if a problem is complex and the
solution does not present itself immediately, experts use
their extensive knowledge base to consciously seek for a
solution. Indeed research has shown that experts may shift
from non-analytical to analytical approaches to deal with
difﬁcult problems (Osman, 2004; Schmidt & Boshuizen,
1993). Novices on the other hand, with their limited
knowledge of the problem, are not expected to proﬁt
from conscious search. However, because they suffer
from working-memory limitations, they may beneﬁt from
deliberation-without-attention.
We tested these ideas in the domain of medicine through
an experiment that was designed to overcome the short-
comings of Dijksterhuis et al.’s studies and included
medical experts in addition to novices.
Methods
Participants
The participants of the study were 34 internal medicine
residents, i.e., physicians in training to become specialists
(mean age 28.97; SD 2.25) of a large teaching hospital and
50 fourth-year medical students (mean age 24.00; SD
1.71). All eligible participants were invited to voluntarily
participate in the study, and participants received book
vouchers in return.
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Participants were asked to diagnose 12 clinical cases
(6 complex and 6 simple cases), presented randomly in a
booklet. Each case consisted of a description of a patient’s
medical history, signs and symptoms, and tests results
(Appendix 1 presents an example of a case). Cases were
selected from sets of cases used in previous studies
(Mamede, Schmidt & Penaforte, 2008; Mamede, Schmidt,
Rikers, Penaforte & Coelho-Filho, 2007). The complex
cases comprised uncommon diseases, association of dis-
eases, or atypical presentations of a disease. The distinction
between complex and simple cases was based on the
diagnostic accuracy scores obtained by internal medicine
residents in those earlier studies. The list of cases used in
the experiment is presented in Appendix 2.
In a within-subjects design, participants diagnosed the
cases under three experimental conditions, an immediate-
decision condition, and two delayed conditions: conscious
thought and deliberation-without-attention. The sequence
in which the conditions appeared in the booklet was also
randomized. In the immediate-decision condition, partici-
pants were asked to read the case and write down the ﬁrst
diagnosis that comes to mind. After that, they solved
anagrams, a task added to minimize chances that partici-
pants engaged in analytical reasoning under the immediate-
decision condition. Following Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), in
the unconscious thought condition participants were ﬁrst
informed that they would diagnose the case later on, then
read the case, solved anagrams and ﬁnally they were asked
to formulate a diagnosis. In the conscious thought condi-
tion, participants were ﬁrst requested to read the case and
provide an initial diagnosis. They subsequently followed
instructions (Mamede et al., 2008) intended to induce an
elaborate analysis of case information: they had to indicate
which signs and symptoms from the case corroborated or
refuted their initial hypothesis, had to write down at least
one alternative hypothesis and had to proceed with a
similar analysis for each alternative diagnosis. After this
analysis, they indicated the likelihood of the several
hypotheses and made their ﬁnal decision on the diagnosis.
Four cases (2 simple and 2 complex) were diagnosed under
each experimental condition. Time allocated to work on
each case was 8 min and equal in all conditions. The
importance of taking the anagram task seriously and the
restricted time for that were emphasized as an attempt to
minimize a possible carry-over effect (i.e., the possibility
that participants would continue to reason analytically
while solving problems under the other conditions after
having diagnosed a case in the conscious thought
condition).
Analysis
All cases were based on real patients and had a conﬁrmed
diagnosis, against which the accuracy of the participants’
responses was judged. Two experts (board certiﬁed experts
in internal medicine) independently assessed the diagnoses
provided by the participants. The diagnoses were judged
correct, partially correct or incorrect, scored respectively 1,
0.5 or 0. The judges were unaware of the condition in
which the cases had been diagnosed and agreed in 84% of
their judgments. Any disagreements were resolved by
discussion.
The mean diagnostic accuracy scores for complex and
simple cases solved by each participant under each experi-
mental condition were calculated, and the mean score for
each condition was computed for students and residents. As
the data showed a skewed distribution, we performed
square-root transformation using the raw scores. Mean
diagnostic accuracy scores were evaluated by analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with level of expertise (expert versus
novice) as a between-subject factor, and case complexity
(complex vs. simple cases) and reasoning mode (immediate
decision vs. deliberation-without-attention vs. conscious
deliberation) as within-subjects factors. Effect size was
computed for main effects and interactions and post hoc
paired t tests were performed for comparisons across con-
ditions within the groups of doctors and students. For the
conscious thought condition, we computed the mean diag-
nostic scores for the initial diagnoses made by the partici-
pants and for the ﬁnal diagnosis provided after they had
consciously analyzed the case. T tests were performed for
analyzing differences between these two conditions.
Results
Mean diagnostic accuracy scores for cases diagnosed by the
physicians and the students in each condition are presented
in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. There was a signiﬁcant main
effect of case complexity (F(1,83) = 219.26, p\0.001,
partial g
2 = 0.73), validating our distinction between
complex and simple cases, and a signiﬁcant main effect of
level of expertise (F(1,83) = 1118.84, p\0.001, partial
g
2 = 0.93), with doctors performing better than students in
all experimental conditions, which is also a manipulation
check. The two-way interaction effect between reasoning
mode and level of expertise (F(2,82) = 4.993, p\0.001,
partial g
2 = 0.06) was signiﬁcant. The other two-way
interactions did not reach signiﬁcance. The three-way
interaction effect (F(2,82) = 3.35, p\0.04, partial
g
2 = 0.04) was signiﬁcant.
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diagnoses in complex cases in comparison with both
immediate decision-making (t(33) = 2.86, p\0.008) and
unconscious deliberation (t(33) = 3.12, p\0.005). No
differences were found between the immediate decision
and the unconscious deliberation condition (t(33) = 0.67,
p\0.51). In the conscious thought condition, participants
were ﬁrst requested to give an initial diagnosis and, after
thoroughly analyzing ﬁndings in the case, make a ﬁnal
diagnostic decision. The ﬁnal diagnoses made by physi-
cians after consciously thinking about the complex cases
(M 0.58; SD 0.27) were signiﬁcantly better (t(33) = 3.00,
p\0.01) than their initial diagnoses (M 0.45; SD 0.33).
When diagnosing simple cases, the accuracy of physicians’
decisions did not signiﬁcantly differ across the three
experimental conditions.
The students, however, performed differently. No sig-
niﬁcant differences were found between diagnoses made
through immediate decision and unconscious deliberation
for complex cases (t(33) = 0.67, p\0.55). Consciously
thinking to diagnose complex cases led students to poorer
decisions then when they made a diagnosis immediately
(t(33) = 2.08, p\0.05). However, when cases were sim-
ple, unconscious deliberation led students to perform sig-
niﬁcantly better than when they made immediate decisions
(t(33) = 2.28, p\0.03). A marginal effect was found
between conscious deliberation and immediate decision
(t(33) = 1.69, p = 0.10). No effect emerged between
conscious thought and unconscious thought (t(33) = 0.52,
p = 0.61). Finally, within the conscious-deliberation con-
dition, and only for complex cases and for physicians, a
signiﬁcant effect was found between initial diagnosis and
ﬁnal diagnosis: t(33) = 3.00, p\0.006.
Discussion
Our ﬁndings differ considerably from those reported by
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, 2009). In experts, conscious
deliberation was superior to unconscious deliberation and
in line with our hypothesis the effect was strongest for
complex cases. Dijksterhuis and colleagues found con-
scious deliberation to be poorer for complex cases. We
found the opposite. For simple cases, reasoning mode did
not affect experts’ decisions, again differently from their
ﬁndings. Among students, mode of reasoning did not make
a difference, as long as the participants were required to
delay their response. Interestingly, among students and
with complex cases, performance became poorer when
allowed think about the decision. For simple cases, we
found a deliberation-without-attention effect, but only
when that treatment was compared with the immediate-
decision condition.
We offer here an alternative explanation for both our
ﬁndings and those of Dijksterhuis and colleagues. We
distinguish between two cognitive processes that may
underlie diagnostic decision-making. The ﬁrst is a fast
pattern-recognition process in which the cues of a case are
associatively matched against a pattern in memory (Moors
& De Houwer, 2006; Norman & Brooks, 1997; Schmidt &
Boshuizen, 1993). The second is a more elaborate,
knowledge-based reasoning process, in which problem-
Fig. 1 Doctors’ mean diagnostic accuracy scores (on a scale of 0–1)
as a function of case complexity and reasoning mode (n = 34)
Fig. 2 Students’ mean diagnostic accuracy scores (on a scale of 0–1)
as a function of case complexity and reasoning mode (n = 50)
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problem is understood in terms of its underlying structure
(Rikers, Schmidt & Boshuizen, 2002; Stanovich & West,
2000). This distinction between pattern-recognition pro-
cesses and analytical reasoning is in line with dual-process
theories of reasoning and judgment (Evans, 2008; Sloman,
1996). In addition, we argue that a real difﬁculty often
involved in diagnostic reasoning is to overcome the inﬂu-
ence of salient, seductive cues that may lead one down the
garden path. An example may clarify this. Most physicians,
confronted with a patient having a history of coronary
disease and high cholesterol levels, with severe pain behind
the chest bone, would immediately consider a diagnosis of
acute myocardial infarction. This fast, similarity-based,
diagnostic approach leads to accurate decisions in routine
situations and is viewed as an efﬁcient strategy developed
with experience (Norman, 2005; Norman & Eva, 2010;
Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). Nevertheless, this approach may
also fail (Elstein, 2009; Graber, Franklin & Gordon, 2005).
When this initial diagnosis is wrong, it can only be
‘‘repaired’’ by further conscious analysis of the other, less
salient features of the case, leading to the activation of
alternative hypotheses and, eventually, recognition of the
correct diagnosis. This process of conscious thinking about
the case often requires the mobilization of deep, causal
knowledge that helps integrate the salient cues with the less
obvious ones into a new and better diagnosis, or to discard
the salient cues as irrelevant. Doctors often have trouble
overcoming the seduction of salient cues, for instance
because they use shortcuts to quick decisions or because of
premature closure, making it the number-one reason for
diagnostic error (Graber et al., 2005; Klein, 2005;
Redelmeier, 2005). How do these considerations relate to
our experiment?
We assume that responses to the immediate-decision
condition were dominated by pattern recognition, whereas
the conscious-thinking condition induced the more ana-
lytical reasoning process. Let’s ﬁrst look at the effect of
conscious, analytical reasoning on complex cases. Among
doctors, the activation of additional relevant knowledge led
to a sizable effect over the immediate-decision condition.
In fact, consciously thinking about the problem led to a
50% gain in diagnostic accuracy! The validity of this effect
of overcoming initial bias was further strengthened because
we were able to show that, within the conscious-thinking
condition, doctors were very well able to recover from an
initially wrong diagnosis as witnessed by the difference
between initial and ﬁnal diagnosis. In line with the so-
called default-interventionist form of dual process theories,
a rapid intuitive judgment was apparently repaired by
effortful analytical reasoning (Evans, 2008). Among
students, conscious reasoning had a reverse effect. Their
initial diagnosis, although already poor, became worse
when they were allowed to think consciously about it and
considered alternatives. Since these students had little and
largely incorrect knowledge about these complex cases to
begin with (as witnessed by their already poor performance
in the immediate-decision condition), this suggests that the
additional activation of that little knowledge apparently
only confused them further by increasing the number of
incorrect diagnoses to choose from.
Consciously deliberating about the simple cases dis-
played a very different pattern. Since the fast, pattern-
recognition response in doctors already generated a correct
diagnosis in most cases, nothing was gained by further
analysis. Hence no differences arose. However, students
proﬁted from further analysis, suggesting that sufﬁcient
knowledge was available to diagnose these easy cases but
this knowledge had to be activated ﬁrst in order to help
students overcome initial bias produced by salient cues,
similar to what happened to the doctors confronted with
complex cases.
What role is there to play for deliberation-without-
attention in diagnostic decision-making? A limited one, it
seems. In most conditions, there was no signiﬁcant
difference with the immediate-decision response, similarly
to what has been shown in other recent studies (Newel,
Wong, Cheung & Rakow, 2009; Rey, Goldstein &
Perruchet, 2009), suggesting that unconscious thinking did
not really facilitate problem solving. There seems to be,
nevertheless, instances in which it helps. In our study, only
in students confronted with easy cases there was an effect
of deliberation-without-attention. Based on Dijksterhuis
et al.’s (2006) assumption that unconscious thinking allows
for an associative process in which all cues are weighted
equally, one may assume the following: the students had
sufﬁcient knowledge to solve these simple cases, but were
initially seduced to some extent by some salient (and
irrelevant) cues. The associative process postulated by
Dijksterhuis and colleagues may have weakened the
inﬂuence of the salient cues, allowing other cues to equally
inﬂuence the diagnostic decision. Hence a better
performance.
Our explanation for the ﬁndings is to some extent
speculative, as further research is required to provide
additional information on the nature of errors committed
under the various conditions. We investigated diagnostic
decisions under experimental conditions, which may
restrict generalization to real settings and to other types
of decisions. The conscious thought condition in our
study comprised an elaborate, structured approach to
analyze case features, and it may be argued that this helps
more than the deliberation-with-attention condition in
Dijkterhuis et al.’s (2006, 2009) studies. On the other hand,
it allowed checking whether participants were in fact
thinking about the case. Furthermore, one may reasonably
590 Psychological Research (2010) 74:586–592
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reason while thoroughly analyzing a patient’s problem.
A more accurate picture of decision-making seems to be
drawn, when expertise is taken into account and problems
replicate real situations encountered in professional life in
complex domains. In line with recent studies (Acker, 2008;
Lassiter, Lindberg, Gonza ´lez-Vallejo, Bellezza & Phillips,
2009), our ﬁndings cast doubts on the statement that
unconscious thought is the superior mode of making
complex decisions. Experts confronted with complex
problems can make better decisions after consciously
thinking about their choices, which is a conclusion with
signiﬁcant implications for (clinical) practice. If one does
not have knowledge in a domain, then relying on imme-
diate decisions would be a wiser choice for solving com-
plex problems. Deliberation-without-attention apparently
only helps beginners faced with simple problems.
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Appendix 1
A 63-year-old male arrives at the emergency room with
intense precordial pain and sweating. He has had a history
of coronary disease and was admitted to hospital 2 years
ago due to a posterior wall myocardial infarction. For the
past 30 years the patient has had moderately controlled
hypertension. The patient has type II diabetes mellitus and
has a history of smoking. He has a family history of heart
disease.
The patient has had effort angina that disappeared with
sublingual nitroglycerin (NGT) and rest, without changing
patterns over the last 30 days. Four hours before presenting
to the hospital, the patient was lifting a 22-kg bag of fer-
tilizer when he suddenly felt intense non-radiating pre-
cordial pain, along with sweating, nausea and a feeling as if
he would faint. He used sublingual nitroglycerin but it did
not help to relieve the pain.
Physical examination shows a sweating patient with
complaints of pain in the left hemithorax, now radiating to
theneckandtheinterscapulararea.BP:80/40 mmHg;pulse:
110/min; respiratory rate: 24/min. Heart: normal S1 and S2
sounds, S4 gallop sound, diastolic murmur (grade 3/6) more
intense at the left sternal border. Lungs: basal crepitations in
both lung ﬁelds. Abdomen: soft, without signs of peritoneal
irritation; no palpable masses. Peripheral pulses: right radial
pulse:1/4;leftradialpulse:4/4;rightandleftfemoralpulses:
3/4, symmetrical.
Diagnosis: aortic dissection.
Appendix 2
List of cases used in the study.
Simple cases
1. Aortic dissection
2. Acute viral hepatitis
3. Hyperthyroidism
4. Acute alcoholic pancreatitis
5. Liver cirrhosis
6. Acute viral pericarditis
Complex cases
7. Small cell lung cancer
8. Sarcoidosis
9. Addison disease with tuberculosis
10. Pneumonia with sepsis
11. Claudication due to occlusive arterial disease
12. Acute bacterial endocarditis
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